Jumblatt Recounts Mountain War Complexities in Detailed Historical Testimony

Walid Jumblatt, the former head of the Progressive Socialist Party, offered a comprehensive narrative of the Mountain War's defining moments and the turbulent events of the 1980s during an appearance on the "Witness to the Era" program, examining how local and regional actors shaped the violent confrontations that began in 1983.

The establishment of checkpoints and the positioning of Lebanese military units in the mountain region, according to Jumblatt, set the stage for the erupting violence. He characterized the Mountain War as "a major military and political explosion that took on a sectarian dimension." At the height of his influence, Jumblatt commanded approximately 10,000 fighters, while Prince Majid Arslan, he noted, lacked an organized military force.

Jumblatt recounted a pivotal encounter with Bashir Gemayel in Baabda, conducted in the presence of President Elias Sarkis. When Jumblatt inquired why Gemayel had dispatched forces to the mountain, Gemayel cited the need to safeguard Christians. Jumblatt disputed this reasoning, stating such an approach was counterproductive. He expressed his opposition to Bashir Gemayel's 1982 presidential bid, viewing him as representative of the Lebanese right's extremist wing. Jumblatt argued that the concept of a "strong president," favored by certain Maronite factions, represented a strategic error, as the nation's leader must command legitimacy across all religious communities rather than merely dominating within a single sect.

Regarding his dealings with Amin Gemayel, Jumblatt indicated he paid a condolence visit following his brother's assassination, despite subsequently adopting a confrontational stance. He mentioned that communications and meetings between them had occurred, including an encounter in Paris. Jumblatt also referenced concerns raised by Amin Gemayel about Lebanese Forces commanders who had grown too independent to respect his authority following Bashir's death.

During the military phases of the conflict, Jumblatt observed that certain Lebanese Army brigades aligned themselves with the "Lebanese Right," though he emphasized that military officers also supported his forces. Among the military figures he highlighted was Sunni officer Al-Walid Sukkariyeh, known as Ibn Baalbek, whom he counted among the battle's notable commanders. During the Bhamdoun engagement, Jumblatt requested armored support from General Hikmat Al-Shihabi, resulting in the delivery of two or three tanks through intermediary Ahmed Jibril.

The conflict's international dimensions loomed large, Jumblatt explained, with Syria, the United States, the Soviet Union, France, Israel, and Palestinian factions all participating in the broader Cold War competition. Syria's backing of the Druze and allied forces reflected this strategic framework, he noted. American bombing campaigns during the Souq al-Gharb battles were countered when Syrian forces downed two American aircraft over Lebanese territory.

Jumblatt addressed a December 1982 assassination attempt against him, clarifying that it did not precipitate the deterioration in relations with Maronite leaders as commonly assumed. He revealed that Elie Hobeika later admitted orchestrating the car bombing but withdrew from the plan upon discovering that Americans were present with Jumblatt.

Tracing the conflict's deeper historical roots, Jumblatt referenced the 1860 events, noting that Al-Mukhtara served as one of Fuad Pasha's administrative centers, where senior figures faced imprisonment. His great-grandfather, Saeed Jumblatt, was detained in Beirut during that period.

Jumblatt's assessment concluded that the era emerged from intricate interactions between Lebanon's internal dynamics and the regional and international balance of power. Comprehending this period, he maintained, demands a political framework that transcends sectarian explanations to encompass the broader regional conflict landscape.